AN ACCESSIBLE WINDOW INTO CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT


This first English-language volume on strategy by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was translated by a team of experts at the Academy of Military Sciences from the original Chinese-language version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by two major generals with significant ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers to China’s powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo Standing Committee, this volume undoubtedly reflects elements of critical policy trends in Beijing and hence merits close examination by foreign researchers and policy makers. Since this book has deliberately been made accessible to an overseas audience, it is important to reflect on what message its English-language publication may be intended to convey.

The 2001 Chinese-language version is used to educate senior PLA decision makers, including those on the CMC, as well as officers who may become China’s future strategic planners. Now in its fourth printing, it can be read along with a variety of other texts, such as the more operationally and tactically focused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue), published by China’s National Defense University in 2000, the better to understand actual PLA doctrine. The closest U.S. equivalent to these volumes collectively might be Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0).

Part One surveys China’s historical experience and development of military theory. The authors describe the current age as an “era of sea,” in which maritime states, like their predecessors, will employ Mahanian and other strategies to “actively develop comprehensive sea power” and “expand strategic depth at sea.” Part Two offers Chinese perspectives on the laws and conduct of war. Chapter 9, on “Strategic Deterrence,” deserves particular attention, as it clearly provides a rationale for many elements of the PLA’s modernization program that have been overlooked by many foreign analysts. Part Three examines future warfare and the implications for China, including recent PLA experience and combat guidelines. Throughout the volume, the continuing relevance of the People’s War is emphasized as a foundation of Chinese military strategy.
It is this third section that will be of greatest interest to Western scholars seeking insights into PLA thinking about China’s strategic situation. The authors of this volume believe that China, both a land and a sea power, faces multifaceted strategic opportunities and challenges. Despite its eighteen-thousand-kilometer coastline, China is currently constrained by the world’s longest island chain, centering on strategically, politically, and economically vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from China’s only disputed territory, however: “1,000,000 square kilometers” of maritime territory, “one ninth of China’s national land territory,” remains under contention. The authors also identify energy supply security as critical to China’s national development. Their statement that the South China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves equivalent to that of [the] Middle East” conflicts with Western assessments, however, leaving the reader wondering about the true strategic underpinnings of Beijing’s claims.

The authors foresee possible threats to China’s “sovereignty, maritime rights, and great cause of reunification,” threats that, should all other measures fail, may necessitate a defensive (and therefore inherently just) war on China’s “borderlines, seacoasts, and air spaces.” The resulting “high-tech local wars” may well require the PLA to confront a technologically superior adversary. Accordingly, the authors suggest emphasizing preemption; employment of a broad spectrum of military technologies, including asymmetric “trump card” weapons; and integration of civilian and military forces in missions (e.g., “guerrilla warfare on the sea”) that incorporate political, economic, and legal warfare. While this volume raises as many questions as it answers, it is nevertheless a welcome contribution to a vital field in which so little authoritative information is available.

ANDREW S. ERICKSON
Naval War College


Peter Howarth, an Australian former diplomat and intelligence analyst, presents an excellent mix of strategic theory, political dynamics, and tactical detail in considering the Chinese submarine fleet. His treatment demonstrates a keen understanding of both parts of the phrase “politico-military strategy,” and it is the type of thinking that Jeffrey Record of the Air War College recently opined is too often missing in the American community. Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if only because one gets to visit so many old friends in strategic theory, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie, Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tse-tung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu. Like so many others who write about China’s navy since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sensational claims on the subject, presumably thereby justifying the work and attracting attention. However, what distinguishes Howarth from so many others who have searched and found reasons to be alarmed at the conventional naval power of China is that he
tempers the sensational with frank assessments of China’s limitations.

At the heart of this examination of Chinese submarines, practically speaking, is the potential showdown over Taiwan. While Howarth notes that “China, like Germany, is handicapped by geography,” he points out that the defense of Taiwan is equally handicapped by oceanography: its narrow and crowded seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His frankness, however, about such U.S. problems as naval drawdown, global responsibility, vulnerability of surface ships to missile saturation, and the difficulties of operations in narrow seas gives one new pause.

As an example of what is best about his work, Howarth considers not only the tactical problems for China, Taiwan, and the United States (including the exact requirements for successful submarine warfare against a carrier-based navy) but also the proper political context of that potential conflict—that a politically free and economically prosperous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at the heart of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to the intersection of tactics and strategic judgment, Howarth includes in his final chapter an economical summary of the logic by which Chinese decision makers might be optimistic enough about their chances for success to initiate a conflict with Taiwan.

One weakness in this confluence of politics, strategy, and tactical matchups is that Howarth exaggerates the strategic influence of the great thinkers on policy. His demonstration of how submarine warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches, suggesting as it does that submarine warfare fits perfectly with preformed Chinese strategic preferences. The logic of a preemptive surprise attack is part of the Chinese strategic culture, he says, but one does not have to cite the number of wars per year in which the Ming dynasty engaged, for example, in order to support the conclusion that “the Pentagon has some justification in considering that the risk of Beijing resorting to force to try to resolve the Taiwan issue is growing with the modernization and transformation of the PRC’s military capabilities.”

Howarth is better off with his more elegant logic that submarines are designed for the task of concealment and surprise and that surprise is a good tactic when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern and Western war planners have both made use of the submarine and have appreciated it for the qualities for which it is designed, regardless of whether they were Chinese or their ancient ancestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu.

Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to blend classic strategic thinking with current politics and tactical complexities that is informative, intelligent, and provocative in this book. It is recommended for any library on naval affairs or Asian conflict, and good reading for both U.S. and Chinese war planners.

PETER J. WOOLLEY
Fairleigh Dickinson University


Given the importance of the Taiwan issue for U.S. foreign and security policy in East Asia, it is striking that relatively little has been written on Taiwan’s defense reform and modernization.
programs, especially in contrast to the substantial amount of work scholars and policy analysts have produced in recent years on Chinese military modernization and its implications for regional security. Bernard Cole’s *Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects*, which provides a comprehensive and well written assessment of recent developments in Taiwan’s defense establishment, represents an important step in filling this gap.

In this work, Cole—a respected China scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for thirty years and is now professor of international history at the National War College—examines the changes currently under way in Taiwan’s armed forces and defense bureaucracy. The main purpose of Cole’s thorough and well researched study is to assess changes in Taiwan’s defense posture and their implications for the island’s security. After presenting a brief history of Taiwan’s military and an overview of the Chinese military threat, Cole explains that Taiwan in recent years has been unwilling to increase the level of resources devoted to its own military capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorganizing its defense bureaucracy and its military is professional and well trained, the growing asymmetry in defense spending between Taiwan and China is resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan’s long-standing qualitative edge over the Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues quite persuasively that the cross-strait military balance is tipping toward China as a result of Taiwan’s relatively modest response to the growing security challenge represented by the acceleration of Chinese military modernization. Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend itself on its own and may not even be able to hold out until the U.S. military could intervene decisively.

Cole also includes a brief discussion of the factors underlying Taiwan’s unwillingness to do more to counter China’s growing military capability. He argues, first, that many officials in Taiwan believe Chinese military threats lack credibility and, second, that decision makers in Taipei are convinced that the United States would come to Taiwan’s assistance even if they turn out to have underestimated China’s willingness to use force. According to Cole, the U.S. decision to send two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan would likely result in American military intervention but also led Taipei to the same conclusion. Given the assumptions that China lacks the willingness to use force and that U.S. intervention is virtually assured in the unlikely event of a cross-strait conflict, many politicians in Taiwan conclude that the island does not really need to invest its own scarce resources in defense. In all, *Taiwan’s Security* makes an important contribution to scholarship and policy analysis by providing a readable and informative assessment of a previously understudied aspect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship.

MICHAEL S. CHASE
Naval War College

Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of China commonly compare this emerging Asian titan to imperial Germany, whose unification upset the European great-power concert ushered in after Waterloo, and for good reason. Naval enthusiasts like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, their imaginations fired by the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, hurled Germany into naval competition with Great Britain, the dominant naval power of the day, with fateful results. References to Mahan are now routine among Chinese strategic thinkers. Will China’s Mahanians prod Beijing onto a similar path to sea power, and will similar results ensue? Along comes Sadao Asada, an emeritus professor at Japan’s Doshisha University. Asada’s masterful book *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor* reminds us that Asian maritime history also offers compelling lessons on how the rise of a new sea power, in this case imperial Japan, can disturb a settled nautical equilibrium. In effect, the book is an intellectual history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). As the title suggests, the book traces the influence of Mahanian theory on Japanese naval thinkers in the decades after *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* appeared in 1890.

Asada attributes the IJN’s use and misuse of Mahan to a combination of factors—bureaucratic rivalry between the army and the navy, groupthink within the naval hierarchy, and an abdication of leadership by senior officials, to name three. By the onset of World War II, the navy had convinced itself that war with the United States was fated and that Japan could overcome America’s overwhelming material superiority by cultivating a warrior ethos in the ranks. Perversely, IJN leaders disregarded key aspects of Mahanian theory, in particular the material foundations of sea power, as they contemplated Mahanian naval warfare in the Pacific. *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor* makes an ideal companion to David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie’s *Kaigun*, which reviews the strategies, tactics, and technologies deployed by the IJN between the service’s inception in Meiji Japan and the outbreak of World War II. Jon Tetsuro Sumida’s *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command*, a spirited defense of Mahan against his detractors, would make a useful supplement and counterpoint to Asada’s analysis.

Asada’s account is not impervious to criticism. First, linking deeds with words and words with thoughts is no simple matter for historians. His many references to Japanese officers, say, “echoing” Mahan or acting out of “Mahanian navalism” invite critics to quibble. The author establishes that many Japanese mariners were reared on Mahan, but how do we know they were acting on Mahanian precepts on some particular occasion if they did not say so? Second, Mahan was prone less to “stark racism” than to the clash-of-civilizations rhetoric that dominated fin de siècle Americans’ views of Asia.

Still, these are minor faults in an invaluable work. Will China, like imperial Japan, succumb to Mahanian determinism? How should America respond? These are questions worth pondering, and *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor* makes a good place to start.

JAMES R. HOLMES
Barrington, Rhode Island
Iraq’s undiminished insurgency has cast an unmistakable pall over the U.S. military’s nation-building mission, which until recently seemed a core competency for the Department of Defense. Both advocates and critics of America’s efforts to bring peace, order, and good government to Baghdad agree that the aftermath of the Balkan wars of the 1990s offers examples of what was not done in the wake of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM’s epic Phase III success in spring 2003. The idea that extended U.S. military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo have resulted in long-term political successes built on well executed nation-building is accepted almost without question. But is it so?

Peace at Any Price poses that difficult question and provides a richly disturbing series of answers that should be of interest to anyone concerned with the ability of Western governments and organizations to bring stability to failed states, even with overwhelming military force at their disposal. The authors, both veterans of UN nation-building in Kosovo, dissent from received wisdom in their survey of Kosovo after more than five years of NATO protection and UN largesse.

What King and Mason find in that troubled, unstable, and impoverished Balkan statelet (which is legally part of Serbia but under international occupation, now inching painfully toward independence) is a witches’ brew of nationalism, corruption, and criminality that bodes ill for the future of Kosovo and surrounding states. The authors begin with a close look at the mid-March 2004 mass rioting that swept through Kosovo, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties and large-scale destruction of property and, above all, shattering any hope of reconciliation between Kosovo’s Albanian majority and dwindling Serb minority. Five years after launching Operation ALLIED FORCE to save the Albanians from the Serbs, NATO troops had to defend the Serbs from the Albanians, and not always with much ardor or success.

King and Mason’s account is balanced and just, sparing no group, least of all the UN, the European Union, or NATO, from fair criticism as to how Kosovo has been governed since mid-1999. This is not a history text—it leaves out all but a limited, necessary understanding of how Kosovo became so troubled by the end of the 1990s—but rather a detailed telling of how ineffective Western political and military institutions have been at transforming Kosovo into anything resembling a law-abiding or self-sustaining society. The authors spend considerable time detailing the depths of interethnic hatreds, from the grand to the petty, that continue to cripple daily life in Kosovo, while refusing to spare Western nongovernmental organizations from critiques of their naiveté and ineffectiveness in dealing with mutual Albanian-Serb fear and loathing.

Peace at Any Price ends with a helpful guide on how the international community can do better the next time it is confronted with a Kosovo. King and Mason’s counsel is wise and well taken, ranging from how to improve war termination to ensure a lasting peace, to how security and the rule of law must be established before democracy can take root, and above all to how “bad habits,” including local “traditions” of
banditry, criminality, and interethnic violence must be altered, by force if necessary, if Western governments and organizations expect to make failed, war-torn states into bona fide members of the international community.

One only wishes that this little gem of a book had been published earlier.

JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College


It does not take exceptional analytical talent to recognize that U.S. policies in the Andean region of South America face severe challenges, especially those dealing with the war on drugs. Neither does it take an exceptional historian to recognize that the United States has all too often paid insufficient attention to its regional neighbors and partners. Finally, it takes no exceptional mastery of international relations to recognize that South America is becoming increasingly important to the safety, well-being, and future prosperity of the United States. For all these reasons, a clear explanation of U.S. policies in the region and evaluation of those policies’ track records and potential future consequences are especially welcome.

To a degree, and despite a somewhat incendiary title, Addicted to Failure provides a portion of the needed understanding. Its editor asked a rather impressively credentialed group of analysts to examine each of the countries in the Andean region and the role that U.S. policy has had in shaping those states’ political futures. These analyses follow Brian Loveman’s own overview of U.S. policies in the entire region. A chapter devoted to the European Union’s efforts follows a state-by-state review, and the book concludes with an examination of a possible preemptive U.S. intervention in Colombia on the scale of operations currently being conducted in Iraq.

However, this volume is not a resounding success. Loveman’s introductory chapter is a case in point. His basic argument seems to be that U.S. policy, whether crafted by Republican or Democratic presidents, formed during or after the Cold War, altruistic or operational in nature, intentional or accidental, has been consistently wrong. U.S. policy, Loveman argues, has for decades made matters worse for Andean states. There are two problems here. First, Loveman’s disdain for past and present U.S. actions actually begins to obstruct and detract from his central argument. Readers expecting to find a more academic and objective analysis may question the objectivity of the author at the expense of the merit of his argument. The second problem is even more serious. Loveman seeks to prove his contention with official U.S. reports and documents, but the quotations are highly selective and all too often presented without context. Indeed, had an equally passionate voice argued the distaff side of Loveman’s argument, this would have been a most interesting volume.

Luckily, the next six chapters are different. Authored by well known and respected scholars, they draw a compelling picture of U.S. policy in the Andean region. Although all are worthy, Orlando Perez’s evaluation of U.S.-Venezuelan policy and Enrique Obando’s analysis...
of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high points of the book. Obando does an especially fine job reviewing the successes and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug policies.

*Addicted to Failure* effectively raises several significant issues for the reader to mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug policy been a costly failure that has made the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier? Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats to the United States beyond those associated with drug trafficking? If the current policies are counterproductive, what are the correct policies? Loveman does not provide convincing answers to the first two questions and does not address the third.

At the end of the day, *Addicted to Failure* is a book that should not be disregarded. It encourages readers to plunge deeper into the complexities of South America. For while Loveman and his authors may not offer any answers, it is clear that the United States will face increasingly complex challenges from this part of the world in the years ahead.

RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

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In *Shining Path* Lewis Taylor provides compelling evidence that the attitude of the people can be decisive in war. That point will not surprise students of warfare; they will recall that two great strategists stressed the central importance of having the people on your side. Focusing primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl von Clausewitz coined the notion that war’s dominant tendencies make a “paradoxical trinity,” of which one pole comprises primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, a blind natural force. The passions, Clausewitz wrote, “that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people.” Concentrating on guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung famously wrote that “in the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops, the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish that inhabit it.”

In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to understand and respect the rural population on the parts of the guerrillas (the Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path”) led by Abimael Guzmán and of the government of Peru came close to dooming the efforts of both sides in the bloody conflict. After the end of hostilities, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that more than sixty-nine thousand Peruvians had been killed in the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the Shining Path responsible for the majority of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao made clear that the end of warfare was not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor shows how close the combatants came, through their own excesses, to defeating their own causes.

Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin American sociology at the University of Liverpool, does not adequately highlight the strategic implications of his subject. In fact, reading his book leaves unanswered the questions of why he wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses his study narrowly on the northern highlands of Peru, which were a particularly brutal locus of armed action. Although he acknowledges that generalized
violence occurred in 1992 in twenty-one of Peru’s twenty-four departments, he ignores other important areas of the conflict. He also writes as though the war in Peru proceeded without an international context, except for the intellectual contribution of Mao Tse-tung. True, the Cold War had ended by the time Peruvian agents captured Guzmán, but many observers think the agents could not have succeeded without the help of outside intelligence. In addition, U.S. funding of antinarcotics programs not only disrupted a source of support to the Shining Path but also relieved economic pressure on the government of Peru when it was sorely stressed by the conflict.

The Peruvian war provides insights for the future of revolutionary movements in Latin America—in countries with elected governments and when no support will be available from a Cuba or a Soviet Union, as it was during the Cold War. Fortunately, any reader interested in those issues, as well as in a systematic treatment of the strategic lessons of two decades of conflict in Peru, can find an excellent source in Cynthia McClintock’s 1998 *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path*, published by the United States Institute of Peace Press.

**PAUL D. TAYLOR**
**Naval War College**

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When a longtime Department of State attorney and former member of the prestigious International Law Commission takes the time to recount his considerable firsthand observations of the performance of the United Nations, *Naval War College Review* readers do well to take notice. At a time when a new U.S. geographic command is being stood up in Africa and military forces find their planning and operations centers increasingly visited by coalition, interagency, international, and nongovernmental organizational representatives, it is indispensable to have a clear understanding of the evolving role of the UN Security Council and its technical commissions and tribunal investigators. Matheson provides us with an insightful description, one that nicely serves that purpose.

The book is arranged in seven chapters and five appendices. The first chapter provides a straightforward description of the UN Charter provisions that serve as the framework for action by the Security Council. It is complemented by chapter 2, which describes the council’s jurisdiction and mandate as the institution charged with the “primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.” The next three chapters provide general descriptions of the three principal modalities of Security Council actions: sanctions, peacekeeping and governance, and use of force. The growing importance of UN technical commissions is then described, followed by an examination of the UN role in prosecuting international crimes. The book is well indexed and includes summaries of some of the key council resolutions and a bibliography that will prove useful to those seeking more detailed coverage.

**Matheson, Michael J.**  
Matheson documents most of the recurring concerns in sanctions (problems with enforcement, collateral consequences, and possible legal limits on sanctions), peacekeeping operations (tensions produced by the principles of consent and impartiality applicable to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations), and the use of force. Also provided is a most welcome description of the various UN technical commissions and of the criminal tribunals established by the Security Council to address crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. His descriptions are concise, accurate, and well documented.

This book admirably serves its descriptive role and supports the author’s thesis regarding the council’s post–Cold War renaissance. In the end, however, one comes away feeling that the UN has been largely spared critical scrutiny in this book, that the writer, though eminently well qualified to take us through a more focused and prescriptive treatment of this vital international institution, stopped short. Now that Matheson has piqued our interest, perhaps he will provide us with those additional insights in a sequel—one that draws out the lessons to be learned from the “re-nascent” Security Council’s response to the acknowledged threats to international peace and security posed by Iran’s nuclear programs and the genocide in Darfur.

CRAGH H. ALLEN
Naval War College

In 2000, Washington Post reporter Dana Priest wrote a series of articles on the rising importance of the regional combatant commanders, comparing them to modern-day “proconsuls” whose Roman forebears served as regional governors and commanders in chief of their military forces. Reveron’s America’s Viceroys examines this comparison, providing a historical and contemporary analysis of contemporary regional combatant commanders and their rising influence in the foreign policy-making arena. (While the implications of this rising trend are left to the reader, nowhere does the book imply that our combatant commanders are present-day Caesars, about to cross the Rubicon and seize Rome.) The last chapter of Reveron’s book expertly examines their rising power and influence on traditional civil-military relations. In short, he finds, administrations use the military in non-warfighting ways, because of its size, capabilities, and “can-do” culture.

It is somewhat ironic that it was the military services and the Pentagon that fought hardest to prevent the ascendency of the regional combatant commanders. Four decades of legislative changes to the Department of Defense and military mistakes from World War II to DESERT ONE finally culminated in passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act finally gave unity of command to the combatant commanders and reduced the service chiefs to the secondary role of training and equipping their forces. In hindsight, however, it was the Department of State, not the service chiefs, who suffered the greatest loss of influence with this change.

The regional combatant commanders today are considered by many within the U.S. government to be policy entrepreneurs. Each commands a large staff, oversees a huge budget, and travels frequently within his region to promote U.S. interests. In fact, our national security strategy now directs regional combatant commanders to engage with regional allies and promote theater security cooperation. A regional viewpoint and focus, instead of the country-specific view represented by U.S. ambassadors, makes combatant commanders ideally suited to promote and implement security agreements with heads of state. Their enormous resources and regional access dwarf the capabilities of the State Department, whose process of policy formulation still resides in Washington, D.C. In contrast, regional commanders are out on the ramparts daily, just like the proconsuls or British viceroys in the days of empire.

In this aspect, readers will find much of value in the book. As Reveron points out, there is a paucity of scholarly research on the subject of foreign policy making by regional combatant commanders and their subsequent encroachment into traditional fields of international relations. Anthony Zinni, a retired Marine Corps general and former commander of U.S. Central Command, describes the book in these terms: “Derek Reveron has put together an excellent work describing the controversial role of our nation’s combatant commanders. It is an insightful, accurate, and provocative presentation of the issues and history done by first-rate contributors who clearly know the subject.” The book is well suited for midcareer officers and students of international relations who are about to enter the field of national security policy making. While the cost of the hardcover edition will certainly deter all but the most avid readers of foreign policy, the paperback is now available for $26.95.

DONALD K. HANSEN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps


At least since medieval expert Lynn White’s controversial argument that the stirrup was responsible for the demise of feudalism, historians have highlighted the seminal role of technology in social change. Paul Gillespie’s compelling, compact history of precision guided munitions (PGMs) is unlikely to raise such an acrimonious debate, but he has provided a valuable contribution to the study of technology and society and, more specifically, to the rapidly growing body of literature concerning the “revolution in military affairs.”

The great advantage of Gillespie’s book is its focus on a single, obviously significant military technology and on that technology’s effect on national security policy. The book traces the history of PGMs from World War I; the grainy picture of a destroyed bridge on the dust cover turns out to be, somewhat surprisingly, not the “Vietnam poster child” for PGMs (the notorious Tranh Hoa Bridge) but a bridge destroyed by an early guided bomb in Burma during World War II. Some readers may find a few of Gillespie’s claims a bit too “Air Force laudatory,” but one should expect
at least a bit of airpower advocacy from a professor of history who teaches at the Air Force Academy. Gillespie’s account is on the whole balanced and well documented, and his frank discussion of some of the less-than-favorable impacts of PGMs on national security policy makes it clear he is not a complete airpower zealot.

Nearly as valuable as the technology-policy linkage is the detailed and intimate look at the technology innovation process itself. Perhaps the best chapter is the author’s account of the mid-1960s development of the Paveway laser-guided bomb. Gillespie makes it clear that this was not the work of an “individual inventive genius” but rather the product of a host of factors ranging from changes in national policy (i.e., “flexible response”), newly available supporting technologies (the laser and integrated circuit), an innovative engineering team from a minor defense contractor (Texas Instruments), and a persistent and bureaucratically adept Air Force colonel.

The biggest disappointment with this work is that despite its October 2006 release date, the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are treated almost as afterthoughts. There are PGM successes that could be amplified from these conflicts (e.g., the evolution of “urban close air support” and even the demise of the terrorist al-Zarqawi), and a fuller treatment would reinforce Gillespie’s central contribution.

Weapons of Choice makes a good case that PGMs have indeed altered the American approach to war as “policy-makers have seized upon precision guided munitions as the key to more humane war.” Gillespie makes clear this is not a wholly positive development, because “an anemic, casualty-averse policy is unlikely to deter or defeat the determined, resourceful foe,” and perhaps more importantly, because “winning and maintaining the peace” has proven much more difficult than destroying targets. While he could have made his argument even stronger, Paul Gillespie makes clear (with apologies to Abraham Maslow) that the mere presence of an elegant hammer could cause policy makers to overlook all but the nails. Iraq and Afghanistan may further reinforce Paul Gillespie’s assertion that “technology best serves those who thoughtfully implement it.”

DAVID BUCKWALTER
Naval War College


Nowadays we take for granted that space assets are necessary for military operations, but the nonmilitary use of space has also passed into the realm of the necessary. While the use of space assets, and thus access to space, is of vital importance to the nation, there is no watershed work that unites the political, economic, industrial, and military aspects into a single vision. Space policy, in other words, is still waiting for its Mahan.

If he is not quite Mahan, veteran space writer William E. Burrows lays a very good foundation for what could evolve into a national (or even international) policy—planetary protection. The author unites two major themes under this concept: protecting the earth from asteroid or comet strikes and monitoring the
global environment to ward off an ecological disaster.

Burrows provides an excellent summary of asteroid strikes, from the dinosaur killer to the 1908 Tunguska impact. But is he overstating the threat? Imagine Katrina on a global scale, or a nuclear power mistaking an asteroid for a nuclear attack and retaliating. A large enough strike could devastate the planet, and, without warning, we could do nothing to prevent it.

Burrows, who also wrote *Deep Black* (1988), argues that overhead reconnaissance systems represent the perfect tool for monitoring the global environment. He asserts that these types of assets can provide early warning of ecological devastation (such as deforestation and overfishing), enabling more effective protection of the environment.

Burrows makes a number of recommendations. He argues for expanded and continued support for ongoing efforts to monitor “near earth objects” and supports a U.S. interagency effort for monitoring the global environment. In the long term, he believes, establishing a human presence in space will be necessary. Unlike other visionaries (such as Gerard K. O’Neill and G. Harry Stine), Burrows declares that permanent human presence in space will follow an economic need, rather than the other way round. His wedge into space is building a data warehouse on the moon to preserve humanity’s cultural and technological heritage. On the moon its contents would be accessible to anyone on earth who could rig a relatively simple communications site. The author also provides a superb political and social history of the space program, up to the present, and provides critical insights on the political drivers for the space program.

Is Burrows’s premise farfetched? The 5 December 2006 edition of the *Washington Times* quoted the December issue of *Popular Mechanics* that on Friday, 13 April 2029, a twenty-five-million-ton asteroid will pass the earth less than twenty-one thousand miles away. At least, scientists claimed there was a 99.7 percent chance the asteroid will miss.

**John R. Arpin**  
Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)  
Centreville, Va.


We are a nation inextricably linked to space. Every instrument of our national power—diplomatic, information, military, economic—relies to some degree on access to and unimpeded use of space. *Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy* uses this fact to illustrate its author’s point that despite an increasing reliance on space capabilities, the United States has yet to develop a comprehensive space-power theory. Klein has written extensively on space-power theory, and this book builds upon many of his previous works, addressing the need for a national space strategy that adequately links space operations with national interests.

Throughout *Space Warfare* Klein astutely draws numerous parallels with space as a medium of national power similar to those of air, land, and the sea as viewed and utilized by independent states. As space capabilities increase in importance in relation to national
power and security around the world, Klein reasons, space will become an arena where states will protect their space assets in the same manner that they protect their sovereign airspace, land, and territorial seas. To this end, he draws upon the historical context of Sir Julian Corbett’s maritime strategy theory as a basis on which to build a comprehensive space strategy. Previous attempts at space strategies have hinged upon using air or naval strategies, or a combination of the two. Klein argues that simply using air or naval strategies is too restrictive and does not adequately capture the uniqueness of space operations. Air and naval strategies in his view are too militarily focused, specifically on offensive weapons, or lack the proper linkage to the instruments of national power. For these reasons he turns to Corbett’s maritime theory, which describes the relationship between land and sea as vital and also serves well as a model for development of space strategy.

This unique approach may be criticized by some. However, these same critics would do well to understand Klein’s use of Corbett not as the be-all and end-all approach to space strategy but rather as a framework upon which to build. In fact, Klein himself admits that his approach to a space strategy largely agrees with current joint doctrine, the Space Commission Report, and other publications. However, his treatment highlights some areas deserving more debate, such as a better understanding of the defense of high-value positions in space and access to what he calls “celestial lines of communication,” a phrase adapted from classic Corbett.

Klein’s Corbett-based space strategy is presented in a fairly easy-to-read way, although some of his basic premises are quite repetitive. Additionally, a few of his recommendations may be viewed as incredibly challenging, if not impossible, from technological and fiscal perspectives.

This is a must-read for military and nonmilitary strategic thinkers with interests or stakes in space operations. While it is sure to raise some eyebrows, particularly in the air and space communities, this book does what it is supposed to do: raise the level of debate on the formulation of a sound space strategy. This is a critically important subject, one that if not properly implemented and understood could have disastrous consequences on our national interests.

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Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. New York: Knopf, 2006. 480pp. $27.95

Lawrence Wright has provided the military professional an excellent primer into the world of those who see the United States as a threat. The Arab world remains little understood by most Americans. It takes Wright nearly five hundred pages to lay out the complex tale of modern Islamic fundamentalism. It is no surprise that Osama Bin Laden is a key player, and Wright gives him center stage. Bin Laden is the son of a wealthy Yemeni who through grit and hard work earned the favor of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia for boldness in civil engineering projects that helped Saudi Arabia advance into the twentieth century.
The 1980s saw the first true conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and a major power, the ten-year war waged by the mujahideen in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, having suffered an unexpected drubbing. Emboldened by their victory against one superpower, many mujahideen, under the spiritual leadership of Osama Bin Laden (who spent some time in Afghanistan during the war), turned to fighting the new threat to Islam posed by the United States. The organization formed from disparate jihadist groups in Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan to meet this task was one whose name would become synonymous with the most violent form of anti-American Islamic fundamentalism—al-Qaeda (the Base). Ironically, it was the United States that, through the CIA, had largely financed and equipped the mujahideen and other anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The Looming Tower is truly a book for our time. The New York Times agrees; it selected it as one of the ten best books of 2006. Drawing upon expertise gained from living and teaching in the Middle East, Wright has written a succinct and engaging work on the history, religion, and temperament of a people who remain at best enigmatic to most Americans. More importantly, Wright’s narrative characterizes the path to September 11th as a lengthy and convoluted one, a journey that started long ago. The attacks on that day were the next step in an irrevocable conflict between elements of radical Islam and the country they saw as a threat to their existence.

The lessons of The Looming Tower are many. The United States can succeed in its fight against the radicals of Islam only if it is completely united, with all internal barriers swept aside. Much has been done in the years since that clear, blue Tuesday morning in September to reconcile that environment. The other take-away is that Bin Laden and his ilk are more complex than their rhetoric would have us believe. His followers, however, see him as a devout Muslim, pure in thought and strident in deed, out to defend his faith from foreign influences bent on its destruction. So as long as the United States remains engaged in that vital region, his likes will remain ever present and ever the threat.

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Joshua Key is a young married man with four children who joined the U.S. Army to escape the grinding poverty of his life in Guthrie, Oklahoma. In 2003, he was deployed to Iraq with the 43rd Combat Engineer Company. At the end of seven months, Key had become so disillusioned with the Army and the Iraq war that he deserted while on leave in the United States. He ultimately made his way to Canada to ask for asylum. Lawrence Hill, a Canadian writer and journalist, put Key’s story into coherent form.

Although the book is well written, it is actually hard to read, because of the U.S. Army’s allegations of Key’s disloyalty, dishonesty, disrespect, selfishness, dishonor, lack of integrity, and cowardice, particularly during his first deployment with the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment to Iraq. Also, like others who have served for many years in the military, I find it tough to read about the wrong-headed thinking and excuses of a deserter.

Yet this is a book that we must read, if for no other reason than not to allow Private Key’s allegations to go unanswered. Consider, for example, that this book sells in Costco’s and is listed as one of its best sellers.

Is Joshua Key a weak man who was pressured by his wife to desert, exaggerating or lying outright about his experience in Iraq to justify his desertion and gain sympathy from the Canadian authorities? Or is Private Key a naive, trusting, moral man who could no longer stomach participation in a constant series of immoral, unethical, and sometimes illegal acts in Iraq? These are the questions that many may ask themselves when reading this book. Further, as a result of this work these troublesome allegations now reside in the public domain. The Army should determine the truth. The outcome will determine if the allegations are to be refuted or if serious soul-searching and significant changes in Army culture, training, and leadership must be pursued.

_The Deserter’s Tale_ does a credible job explaining Joshua Key’s action, and it provides some serious food for thought about how the United States has been selecting, training, and leading its soldiers. However, unfortunately, the book fails to provide a good reason for Private Key’s act of desertion.

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