BOOK REVIEWS

A NEVER-ENDING STUDY


This volume is largely successful not only in emphasizing the continuity and wisdom of Colin Gray’s long-standing defense of the study of strategy but in capturing his delight in skewering the latest intellectual fads in both American and British security theory. *Strategy and History* is a rich and occasionally provocative read for any student of strategy, military issues, or international relations, and it reinforces the need to study strategy—the relationship between military force and desired political objectives.

The introduction and very brief conclusion can stand alone as a valuable beginning to the study of strategy and its core themes. The first section examines the key issues in strategic studies—the meaning of strategy itself and the crucial use of history as a tool to understand strategy and think strategically. The second section examines major contemporary debates in the field of international security—nuclear targeting and deterrence in the 1970s, the revolution in military affairs (RMA) debate of the 1990s, and the broader issue of arms control. The third, and arguably most adventurous, section illustrates the multidisciplinary nature of strategy, looking at geography, culture, and ethics. The first section—representing Gray’s lifelong defense of the study of strategy—is, not surprisingly, the strongest and most cogent; the other two sections are more iconoclastic and, at times, more difficult for the average reader.

Section 1 contains five mutually reinforcing chapters, clearly articulating not only the inherent difficulty in serious study of strategy but its immense and ongoing relevance for the academic, policy maker, and war fighter. The first chapter, written in the 1970s, attacks the Cold War study of strategy in the United States as both ahistorical and technologically determinist—a theme Gray has continued to hammer relentlessly (and properly) throughout his career. This chapter, combined with the second essay in section 2 (on the RMA debate) and Hew Strachan’s recent article in *Survival* on the co-optation of the concept of strategy, constitutes a devastating counterargument to many of the core assumptions of current American
strategic thought, in both academe and the policy world. The second chapter addresses both the strengths and weaknesses of “new security” thinking in academe in the 1990s. This chapter could be of particular value to political scientists and international relations specialists.

The third, fourth, and fifth chapters of this section should be required reading for the modern war fighter and other practitioners. These sections focus on the importance of seapower and maritime strategy, on the enormous complexities involved in making strategy, and on the paradoxes inherent in the principles of war and in efforts to adapt them to the changing international environment. Gray notes that the principles of war are actually principles of warfare—intimately connected with the tactical and operational levels of war but remote from the fundamental issue of waging war to achieve political ends.

The second and third sections do not quite achieve the high standards of the first. The second section’s focus on nuclear strategy, on the RMA debate, and on arms control may seem antiquated to today’s reader. Nevertheless, the notions that the RMA debate failed to consider adversary responses to American technological superiority and that arms control “is as likely to fuel political antagonism as prevent or alleviate it” still have relevance to policy today. The third section’s first chapter notes the salient impact of geography on strategy—an obvious point, perhaps, but one exemplified most recently by the problems of carrying out a counter-insurgency campaign in an Iraq with insecure land borders on all sides. The third chapter is a laudable effort to explain morality and ethics in international relations from the viewpoint of a neo-classical realist. The middle chapter, on strategic culture, is the most daring, and in some respects the most disappointing. Gray attempts to make a very complex argument regarding the definition of strategic culture, but much of the chapter is focused on a debate with Iain Johnston, which readers unfamiliar with this literature may find particularly daunting. This unusual chapter, however, does not detract from the overall value of the volume, which is excellent not only as an introduction to those unfamiliar with the study of strategy but also as a useful addition to the libraries of practitioners, academics, and military officers.

TIMOTHY D. HOYT
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Five years into the U.S.-led global war on terror, Pakistan remains a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in defeating the Taliban and rooting out al-Qa’ida. Despite the importance of Pakistan, it is a country that poses challenges for the United States. A key challenge is the dominant role of the military, which seeks to balance its commitments as a valuable U.S. partner with its role as a guardian of the country’s Islamic identity through its close relationship with Pakistan’s religious establishment. How Pakistan manages these commitments has serious implications for U.S. policy. Fortunately, Husain Haqqani
has come to our aid to help us understand this complex political dynamic.

Haqqani has an insider’s view of Pakistani politics, having served as an adviser to three prime ministers, a diplomat, a political commentator, and a scholar of South Asian politics at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This experience well qualifies him to guide the reader through the complex and, at times, confusing relationship between the Pakistan military, the civil bureaucracy, and the religious establishment.

Haqqani chronicles the early struggles for Pakistan’s formation and makes a convincing case that the lack of a clear vision for Pakistan’s identity in the early period of independence opened the door for the military, the civil bureaucracy, and Islamic ideologues to play dominant roles in Pakistan’s political culture. The largely secular ruling establishment acknowledged Islam as the symbol of unity but did not define how Islam would manifest itself within society. What were the limits (if any) on religion in politics? How would relations between Muslims and other religious groups be managed if Islam was the defining idea of Pakistan? Whose interpretation of Islam would dominate the new country? Questions such as these were never confronted; the new leadership was too preoccupied with others, such as establishing a government, developing an economy, raising an army, and developing a civil bureaucracy.

Haqqani explains how the inability of Pakistan’s founders to delineate Islam’s place in society turned the faith into a political tool for successive military and civilian leaders. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s secular civilian prime minister in the 1970s, began the cynical employment of Islam in politics by attempting to cross it with socialism. It was Bhutto’s courting of the Muslim clergy with “Islamic socialism” that opened the door into politics for Pakistan’s religious establishment.

Bhutto was overthrown in 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq, a man of strong religious convictions. During his eleven-year rule he transformed Pakistan’s identity through a campaign of Islamization of law and society. This process extended throughout the military and spread to the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, which came to be dominated by officers who believed in Zia’s aims. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided Zia an opportunity to support selected mujaheddin groups fighting the Soviets, as long as they aligned with Zia’s religious views and vision for Afghanistan. By the time Zia died in an unexplained plane crash in 1988, Pakistan had, according to Haqqani, changed to an “ideological state guided by a praetorian military.” The centers of power were by now heavily Islamized, through the influence of the religious establishment within the civil bureaucracy and the military.

Haqqani argues that civilian leaders like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif could not reverse the Islamization of Pakistani politics. Instead, both of these leaders tried to coexist with a military heavily influenced by the religious establishment. Both leaders failed, because they eventually ran afoul of the influential military establishment that believed they threatened its position of power.

As he skillfully explains these dynamics, Haqqani also weaves in their effect on the United States–Pakistan relationship.
During the first decade after its chaotic birth, Pakistan sought to form a strategic alliance with the United States. The bilateral relationship during the Cold War was based on U.S. interest in a strong anti-Soviet ally in Asia and Pakistan’s desire for backing against India. This incongruence set up the two countries for misperceptions and unfulfilled expectations that have lasted to the present day.

The relationship was further complicated in the period after the Cold War as U.S.-Pakistan ties frayed over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and the Soviet threat disappeared. As the United States began to scrutinize Pakistan more closely for democratic practices and nuclear proliferation, the pro-American tilt within the Pakistani military began to wane. A series of perceived slights (such as Washington’s refusal to deliver F-16 aircraft after Pakistan had paid for them) and the effective cessation of the bilateral military relationship contributed to this collective attitude. Although the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 resurrected the relationship, it remains to be seen whether the current bilateral cooperation can be sustained for the long term, given the various pressures that the current president, General Pervez Musharraf, is facing.

Haqqani ends the book with a chapter that summarizes his findings and offers suggestions for U.S. policy. Although his diagnosis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is sound, we would benefit from a bit more detail about some of his policy proposals. That is a minor shortcoming; Haqqani has provided an excellent work on understanding the nexus between Pakistan’s religious establishment and military, and on the implications of this relationship for Pakistan’s future.

AMER LATIF
Office of the Secretary of Defense
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This is a timely book. It is a collection of rarely read wartime reports and post-World War I articles that wrestle with the consequences of war and were written by the British officer T. E. Lawrence, otherwise known as Lawrence of Arabia, one of the greatest theoreticians and practitioners of modern guerrilla warfare.

Lawrence, of course, is best known for his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which describes the British-inspired-and-supported Arab revolt against their Ottoman suzerain. Lawrence is back in vogue again, which is not surprising given the involvement of the United States in a seemingly intractable and protracted insurgency in Iraq. Many officers, officials, and academics are turning to The Seven Pillars of Wisdom for nuggets of information about insurgency warfare, or, indeed, about the Arabs themselves. In his foreword, Professor Michael Clarke of King’s College London says that the book “has become an oft-consulted work among military officers presently struggling with the attempt to create order in Iraq.” The Seven Pillars of Wisdom is wonderful prose, but as Malcolm Brown puts it, the work is “no pushover even for the most adept of skim-readers.” It is in
fact more often quoted than read, and I suspect few people get much beyond its key chapter on the principles of insurgent warfare.

That is where this collection comes in. It is not only timely, given the renewed interest in this unorthodox officer and his theories on guerrilla warfare, but extremely valuable for Lawrence’s in-depth analyses of the military situation in the Arabian Peninsula and of the differing fighting styles of an irregular force like the Bedouins and a conventional modern army like that of the Turks.

The book’s first section is a valuable and detailed introduction by the editor, putting Lawrence into historical context as a guerrilla warfare theorist and practitioner. The heart of the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 shows us Lawrence caught up in the rigors and challenges of war. It consists of his dispatches on the irregular war in the peninsula that appeared in a British intelligence publication in Cairo, the Arab Bulletin—a periodical that thanks to Lawrence and many colleagues was not sullied by turgid, army-style language.

Two superb dispatches in part 1 are essential for officers who want to understand irregular warfare. The first, titled “Military Notes,” was written in November 1916. It brilliantly lays out the strengths and weaknesses of the irregular Arab forces facing the Turks. Understand their weaknesses and make use of their strengths and advantages, is what Lawrence is saying about these Arab units. The second dispatch, “Twenty-seven Articles,” written in August 1917, tells how to deal with the Hejaz Arabs. It warns, “Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules.” (The Hejaz is the northwestern coastal zone of present-day Saudi Arabia, where most of Lawrence’s campaigning took place.) This piece has come to the attention of many officers serving in Iraq, particularly those in advisory capacities with Iraqi forces and officials. However, it is not clear that they fully understand this caveat that Lawrence attached: “They [the articles] are meant only to apply to Bede [Bedouin]; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment.” Clearly, the Iraqis are different from the Syrians and the Hejaz Arabs, whether Bedouin or urban dwellers. Lawrence makes clear the tremendous value of understanding the culture during war, something in which the United States has been particularly inept—not least in trying to suggest, whether implicitly or explicitly, that Lawrence’s twenty-seven articles might unlock the secrets of Iraqi behavior.

Part 2 shows Lawrence trying to “cope with the consequences of war in the circumstance of peace.” While much of it is of historical interest, a number of points are as interesting as the dispatches in part 1. I refer specifically to “Demolitions under Fire” of January 1919, which discusses the Arab insurgents’ extensive use of sabotage against Turkish infrastructure in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly against the strategically important Hejaz Railway and its bridges. Equally informative is “Mesopotamia: The Truth about the Campaign” (August 1920); it brilliantly and scathingly castigates the British for their failures and their lies in Mesopotamia, a territory captured from the Ottomans and now known as Iraq. However, the two most important articles here are “Evolution of a Revolt,” written in October 1920, and “Science of Guerrilla Warfare,” 1929. Both are readily available elsewhere, including online, but...
Malcolm Brown has done a great service for those interested in Lawrence’s ideas by including them here.

In conclusion, this is a superb addition to the literature on guerrilla warfare. I enjoyed reading it. Lawrence’s prose and clarity of thinking and exposition made it doubly enjoyable.

AHMED HASHIM
Naval War College


What history buff could possibly resist the subtitle “Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History”? Those so enticed will not be disappointed in Craig Symond’s exceptionally well written and fascinating accounts of these American naval battles: Oliver Hazard Perry’s far-reaching victory over the British in the 10 September 1813 battle for Lake Erie; the 8–9 March 1862 battle of Hampton Roads (which ended in a draw) between America’s first ironclad ships, USS Monitor and CSS Virginia; the 1 May 1898 battle of Manila Bay; the 4 June 1942 battle of Midway; and the 18 April 1988 Operation PRAYING MANTIS in the Persian Gulf.

Because the American navy was absent, Symonds does not list the most crucial naval battle in American history, the early September 1781 battle of the Capes, in which a French fleet prevented the British from resupplying Lord Charles Cornwallis’s besieged troops at Yorktown. Nonetheless, he provides a detailed account of this battle, describing it as “the battle that secured American independence.”

Symonds places special emphasis on crucial command decisions. In this case, he notes, for example, that at a critical moment the British commander, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves, hoisted a flag signal whose ambiguity resulted in failure to concentrate the fleet’s fire on the French, who in large measure prevailed because of this blunder.

This book’s considerable historical value resides as much in Symonds’s highly interesting and detailed description of the British background as in the actual battles. For example, most of us learned in school that impressment by the British of American sailors into the Royal Navy was the prime cause of war in 1812—but I was surprised to read here that some ten thousand were so impressed. While we all knew about Perry’s victory at Lake Erie and his famous report, “We have met the enemy and he is ours,” few have a true idea of its significance. In Symonds’s words, “Perry’s victory secured the northwestern frontier for the United States”—the threat that greatly concerned us.

Symonds’s descriptions of the conditions in which men fought at sea are also masterful. This is especially so in his comparison of the conditions on sailing ships with those of the ironclads, Monitor and Virginia.

Symonds notes that in terms of casualties Virginia inflicted before Monitor’s arrival “the worst defeat in the history of the United States Navy until Pearl Harbor.” The episode clearly spelled the end of an era in naval warfare. The lopsided 1898 victory over the Spanish at Manila Bay, for its part, left the United States “an acknowledged world power.”
and an “empire.” The close-run victory at Midway confirmed the primacy of aircraft carriers and ensured U.S. control of the western Pacific. PRAYING MANTIS was thrown in mainly to demonstrate that new U.S. weapons do work—albeit, in this case, against a rather feeble Iranian foe. Curiously, Symonds fails to note that a few months earlier, the battleship USS Iowa had dramatically demonstrated far greater peacekeeping capability than the extensive, missile-equipped fleet he described.

WILLIAM LLOYD STEARMAN
Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History


Innovation is one of the four pillars of the U.S. Defense Department’s Transformation Plan. Innovation has nudged its way into the mission statements and strategies of most business and government organizations, because it is essential for competitive positioning and sustained performance. Yet in spite of executive proclamations and substantial investment, a majority of organizations report disappointing innovation results. Making Innovation Work does a thorough job of converting the concept of innovation into a practical management framework. Although the book is research-based and two of its authors are academics, it provides practical tools and techniques for managing the end-to-end innovation process. It also debunks several innovation myths, such as creativity and management discipline being incompatible. Examples and vocabulary are clearly geared to a business audience. There are several excellent books on military innovation, but most are analytical and retrospective. This is a “hands on” book about the management of innovation, and leaders of national security organizations will appreciate the relevance of the book’s framework.

This book is geared to leaders who manage innovation in large successful organizations. Paradoxically, large successful organizations typically have the weakest innovation results, because innovation requires deviation from the practices and technology that have served them so well over the years. At times the book becomes a bit repetitive, and word or phrase usage can become confusing, but the liberal use of graphics and text boxes to deliver important insights, examples, and models is quite effective.

The authors’ innovation model is a four-cell matrix. The two axes (Technology, Business Model) are subdivided into “New” and “Existing.” The four cells categorize distinct types of innovation, labeled “Incremental,” “Business Model Semi-Radical,” “Technology Semi-Radical,” and “Radical.” An innovation project utilizing existing technology but employing a new way of conducting business is categorized as “Semi-Radical.” An example is iPod/iTunes, which uses existing technology but dramatically alters the way music is acquired. This type of product is called a “disruptive innovation.” It fundamentally changes the marketplace and the organization’s competitive position in it. The authors’ premise is that the category of innovation is an important consideration, since it sets the stage for
what the organization must commit in resources, capabilities, and management tools. For instance, incremental innovation reapplies existing technology and business practices. It can be delivered in a shorter time with less expense than radical or semiradical innovation, but it lacks the punch for competitive repositioning.

The authors’ working definition of innovation is capturing creativity and then adding value so it benefits the organization. Their innovation framework is a sequence of integrated management decisions and actions. The first and most important decision is determining whether the innovation project is aligned with the organization’s strategy and capabilities. There is extensive discussion about modifying an organization’s culture so that it can sustain innovation. Every organization has what the authors call “antibodies,” those rules, attitudes, procedures, and habits that insidiously suffocate new ideas. Leadership must provide management systems to support the innovation process, such as mechanisms to capture and evaluate creative ideas, ensure adequate resources, measure progress, and reward personnel. The authors repeatedly emphasize that the integrity of the innovation process and the results reflect leadership’s skill and commitment.

The audience for this book is business executives. However, military and national security leaders will find practical recommendations and management techniques applicable for their mission. The book contains an extensive bibliography and references.

HANK KNISKERN
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 Those serving in the military and foreign service stereotypically show scant professional interest in religion. Presumably the security and interests of states hinge on secular concerns. Merging religion with politics only complicates matters, often inviting violence, as wars of religion or terrorist acts of militant Islamists remind us. Religion and Security innovatively complicates such Westphalian dispositions, urging readers to appreciate the religious complexities of today’s global security environment and to consider the possibilities that constructive religious engagement offers for citizens and states the world over. Yes, religion is part of the problem, we are reminded, but it is part of the solution as well. “There is, quite simply,” the book argues in toto, “a positive nexus between religion and security, and the international community ignores it at its considerable peril.” Why we have been slow to come to this conclusion is hypothesized in the first chapter, by strategic-studies expert Pauletta Otis.

Editors Robert Seiple and Dennis Hoover have assembled a dynamic and diverse array of scholars, practitioners, and experts from many fields and political walks of life. Seiple, former U.S. ambassador at large for International Religious Freedom, and Hoover both belong to the Institute for Global Engagement, the “think tank with legs.” They have divided the book into four sections, examining religion’s relationship to violence and insecurity, pluralism...
and political stability, military intervention and conflict resolution, and human freedoms and civil society. Collectively, the book’s fourteen chapters convey the point that theology, scripture, ethics, and religious studies contribute essential resources to global stability and a mature understanding of international affairs. Several overarching themes hold the book together; only a few underrunning concerns common to edited volumes impede its steep ambitions.

Foremost, the contributors caution readers about the inadequacies of traditional realist paradigms. An overdetermined realpolitik not only obstructs religious concerns from political view but depletes the ethical resources that often flow from religious ideas. See especially chapters by Robert Seiple and ethicist Jean Bethke Elshtain, who draw respectively from scripture and the just-war tradition to argue forcefully for responsible civic engagement on behalf of victims of atrocities. Several essays point up that it is hardly “realistic” to ignore so potent a force of human identity and motivation as religion. Kevin Hasson’s political-philosophical analysis powerfully drills home the notion that any sustainable political structure or system must presuppose a “moral anthropology” or account of human nature in which the “built-in thirst for the transcendent” can flourish and be protected. Historian Philip Jenkins’s essay also argues for protecting religious freedom: societies that repress or eliminate religious opposition often embolden those they persecute, driving them underground, militarizing them, sacralizing their persecution, and creating long-term animosities and insecurity. Where Jenkins offers a wide range of examples, an illuminating chapter by Chris Seiple and Joshua White casts a focused look at Uzbekistan, a latent hotspot below many people’s security radar screens. Together, these authors showcase a central motif: when religious freedom is jeopardized for some, political stability is imperiled for many—a worry that should consume any self-styled realist. Reciprocally, as chapters by Christopher Hall, Osman bin Bakar, and others reveal, when religious pluralism and tolerance are nurtured, political security is made more certain.

A shared vision in this volume is the need for a more comprehensive political outlook than political realism customarily affords. Various authors issue calls for a more “holistic,” inclusive, and robust political ethic that extends beyond a cramped view of states and their rulers and interests by engaging citizens, civic groups, and those who struggle—often in the shadows, sometimes through force—for a place in the political daylight. Given the era of globalization in which we dwell, an approach more attuned to dispersed power structures is more realistic than certain traditional forms that “hard” geopolitics offer. Thus does Harold Saunders (a twenty-year veteran of the National Security Council) appeal for an alternative paradigm of “relational realism,” one that takes stock of the “full complex of human interactions that contribute to (or subvert) security.” Thus does Hall argue for the cultivation of “religious diplomacy” and “diplomatic virtues,” echoing Douglas Johnston, whose foreword proposes the creation of religious attachés in the U.S. Foreign Service. (The U.S. military should follow suit.) Thus does Elshtain elevate low realist expectations with a tenable model of citizenship she labels...
“justice as equal regard”—the equal right of besieged victims to have force used on their behalf.

Those of us who serve or have served in the military often draw our battle lines starkly: black and white, good and evil, us and them. This crucial book offers a chastening reminder not only of the many shades of gray needed to nuance a view of religion as it relates to global security in a confusing new age but also of the richly colorful tapestry woven by religious ideas and approaches to political problems. If that doesn’t persuade, then simply recall the book’s thesis: nations that respect religion’s role in the world are far more secure than those that do not.

JOHN D. CARLSON
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Ralph Sawyer continues his work on Chinese political and military writings with The Tao of Spycraft. The title, however, may be somewhat misleading. Rather than compartmentalizing intelligence separate from other endeavors, Sawyer demonstrates how intelligence is an integral aspect of war, diplomacy, and politics.

A sampling of current war college articles shows a strong interest in “integrating all elements of national power,” for which the Defense Department uses the acronym DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Sawyer demonstrates that this was a common concept thousands of years ago in China. Diplomatic maneuvers, economic inducements, propaganda, and whispering campaigns were all an essential element of statecraft. Most important, unlike our contemporary U.S. attitudes, intelligence was not isolated as some kind of supporting activity or a commodity accessed when needed but an integral part of all state activities.

The book is divided into six parts: Early History, Spycraft, Covert Activities, Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and Prognostication, Divination, and Nonhuman Factors. Each part contains several topical chapters, each rich with examples from Chinese history. For example, part 4 (Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence), chapter 10 (“Basic Theory and Issues”) provides a primer on critical thinking and evaluation as good as any contemporary U.S. intelligence text. It addresses analytic biases and prejudices, how to judge the reliability and credibility of sources, how to make assessments on limited information, and confidence levels of assessments—all issues the intelligence community must continually address.

Several common concepts run the length of the book. The first is the integration of intelligence into statecraft. Another is the view that intelligence is essentially a human endeavor. The statesman, the general, and the spymaster must understand both human nature in general and the personalities of their colleagues, allies, and enemies in particular.

This work is not without flaws. It cries out for maps, especially political maps of the “Spring and Autumn” and “Warring States” periods. The book assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of traditional Chinese history and

As the first English-language analysis of its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case study fills a critical gap in the literature concerning the maritime dimension of Japanese national security. This is an exciting issue at a dynamic time: in October 2004, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and coast guard led Northeast Asia’s first Proliferation Security Initiative exercise. In the Indian Ocean, the MSDF is currently fueling allied vessels to support operations in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Japan is struggling to assert control over its exclusive economic zones, the boundaries of which are increasingly contested by China and South Korea.

Graham (currently a British government researcher at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s North Asia and Pacific Research Group) draws on fresh, original sources, including Japanese-language documents and interviews with Japanese officials, to demonstrate that while Japan’s defense and foreign policy have changed dramatically since its opening up to the world in 1853, sea-lane security has been an enduring national security concern. Graham offers insight into Japanese leaders’ and analysts’ perceptions of their nation’s own security context, thereby avoiding the tendency of much related scholarship to view matters exclusively through the prism of relations with the United States.

Graham situates resource-poor Japan in its geographic context: “Although at nearly 30,000 km, Japan’s coastline is one-third longer than that of the United States, no inland point is more than 150 km from the sea.” He explains Japan’s historical concern with the security of its sea lines of communication (SLOC), citing official Diet testimony that “the greatest cause of [Japan’s World War II] defeat was the loss of shipping” to the Allied blockade. Graham records a recent manifestation of Japanese SLOC concerns: Prime Minister (1996–98) Ryutaro Hashimoto’s worry that “many commercial flights and aircraft [were] forced to divert around those areas affected” by China’s March 1996 missile tests, during which “some of the missiles landed in waters only 60 km from [Japan’s] Yonaguni island.”

Graham’s analysis is well written, organized, and documented; based on numerous, very current data; and highly accessible to the reader. It is thus an essential reference for analysts of East Asian security.

Given this significant achievement, one hopes that Graham and other scholars will conduct follow-up research concerning such areas relevant to Japan’s future SLOC security as China’s maritime legal and naval development. Some assessments may need to be revisited as additional data becomes available. For
instance, while Graham suggests that China’s Song diesel submarine program may have “fail[ed] . . . to develop according to schedule,” it is now noteworthy the extent to which Song development appears to have progressed in parallel to China’s importing of Kilo diesel submarines from Russia. Graham projects that SLOC security will continue to preoccupy Japanese planners as a fundamental national concern. He breaks significant ground by showing that Japanese policy makers, motivated by increasingly “realist” threat perceptions, are exploring new directions in the pursuit of SLOC security. The extent to which these emerging impulses can transcend funding constraints (imposed increasingly by demographic and economic challenges) and constitutional limitations (still protected, to some degree, by domestic politics) remains a pivotal question for all concerned with East Asian security.

ANDREW S. ERICKSON
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Several years ago I received a phone call from Stephen Johnson asking about my service on the USS Scorpion (SSN 589), my first ship, between the fall of 1961 and the winter of 1962. He explained he was writing a book about its loss in late May 1968 with its entire crew of ninety-nine. I spoke with him at some length and sent some material about the vast “SubSafe” program changes that occurred within the Submarine Force after the loss of USS Thresher (SSN 593) in April 1963. Silent Steel is the exquisitely researched result of my tiny input and that of more than 230 others—ranging from the widows of Scorpion sailors, submarine design engineers and naval architects, and a list of active-duty and retired personnel that reads like a “who’s who” of the then and now Submarine Force. The bibliography itself spans two dozen pages of applicable books, journal articles, official reports, memorandums, and other miscellaneous correspondence. Anyone expecting to find a clear and unambiguous set of events and circumstances that “explain” the Scorpion’s loss will be disappointed. Rather, along with fascinating personal insights into some key players, the reader will find erudite and technically credible discussions on the facts and assumptions of any number of popular and not so popular theories. For example, his dispassionate and objective examination of much of the same material that was available to formal Navy courts of inquiry virtually rules out any concept of “hostile action” and substantially weakens the plausibility of incidents involving the ship’s own torpedoes. He subtly chides some advocates for having drawn three-significant-figure conclusions from one-significant-figure assumptions. In addition, by bluntly describing some bureaucratic foibles and tragic administrative decisions (such as shortchanging Scorpion’s SubSafe package during a 1967 refueling overhaul to save money), Johnson’s work leads one to perceive that—as is true in virtually all submarine disasters that we know something about—there had to have been some series of complicating, cascading events that overwhelmed any efforts by the crew to bring
the (perhaps minor) initiating casualty under control. For those who delight in finding small technical mistakes, there are a few, if one looks closely enough—for example, the Scorpion’s fire control system was not a Mark 113 but a vintage Mark 101. But none detracts from the overall high quality of the investigative effort.

Even without a specific “cause célèbre” event to dissect and review for “lessons learned,” Silent Steel provides much to think about for anyone interested in or involved with combating casualties at sea. There is even some consolation, however small in comparison to the loss of life, in the knowledge that the United States has come to realize to a significant degree in the years since that “material readiness is a consumable”; we are reluctant to run ships (and people) as hard as we did in the early to mid-1960s. When I rode Scorpion, it averaged more than three hundred days a year at sea. Today, even with dwindling platform resources, the Submarine Force has begun to say no to many of the increasing operational requirements from senior regional and national commanders.

James H. Patton, Jr., Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)


This State Department volume, the first of five that will cover the end period of the Vietnam War, documents major foreign policy issues of the Nixon administration, with a focus on U.S. policy toward Vietnam, Cambodia, and to a lesser extent Laos during the period of January 1969 to July 1970. What a time it was!

In the 1968 presidential campaign, candidate Richard M. Nixon stated that he had a plan to end the war in Vietnam. As it turned out, the “plan” was embryonic. When he took office he moved slowly, convinced that how the United States ended the war would have an enduring impact on future American foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser, became the key figure in the effort to end the war, a program that became known as “Vietnamization.”

Vietnamization was directed toward the upgrading of South Vietnamese forces, which was to be accompanied by phased withdrawals of U.S. forces. Completion would depend on how things went in Vietnam. This work, in addition to documenting policy efforts to move this program along, also documents efforts to convince Hanoi that it was dealing with a strong adversary: for example, secret U.S. bombing of Cambodia, integration of the secret war in Laos with the conflict in Vietnam, and covert operations against North Vietnam.

One of the principal themes developed here is the search for a negotiated settlement, first in the Paris Peace Talks and then through secret meetings between Kissinger and North Vietnamese foreign minister Xuan Thuy and special adviser Le Duc Tho. Here, and throughout the book, Kissinger’s memorandums to Nixon are the key documents. Many appear in Kissinger’s memoirs; however, in this work they are more complete.

In March 1970, Cambodia’s Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown by the Lon
Nol government. For years enemy sanctuaries and supply caches on the border area of that country had been a problem for Americans and South Vietnamese. Now there was a government in Phnom Penh that would permit something to be done about it. By April, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces were mounting operations in the former sanctuaries.

Soon the notion of American forces participating in cross-border operations was considered. The last third of this book is dedicated to the Cambodian incursion, and here Keefer’s editorial notes and footnotes are particularly valuable. Some touch upon the U.S. domestic situation that developed in that unforgettable spring of 1970: “On May 4, 1970 at approximately 4:45 p.m., the President told Kissinger, ‘At Kent State there were 4 or 5 killed today. But that place has been bad for quite some time.’” The footnote goes on to develop related conversations through May 7.

This volume is an essential source for anyone researching the period, in particular American foreign and military policy toward Southeast Asia. Edward Keefer has done an outstanding job in bringing together and giving focus to this vital aspect of American foreign policy during the early Nixon administration.

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“It is the nature of great events to obscure the great events that came before them.” This memorable phrasing begins nineteenth-century historian Francis Parkman’s masterwork on the French and Indian War, Montcalm and Wolfe. One hundred twenty years later, Fred Anderson’s The War That Made America clears away with lucid prose and effective narrative style the obscurity that has veiled the French and Indian War. Described as the “first world war” by Winston Churchill, it was the fourth in a series of six wars fought between England and France and their various allies between 1689 and 1815. It enflamed French Canada and British North America from the Carolinas to Nova Scotia, and it spread to Europe, the Caribbean, West Africa, India, and eventually to the Philippines. Despite this nearly worldwide conflagration and the approximately 800,000 total military casualties that occurred in all theaters, this conflict (also commonly known as the Seven Years’ War) is no more familiar to most Americans than the Peloponnesian War, according to Anderson. His highly readable and concise history, primarily focused on the fierce struggle from 1754 to 1760 between the British, the French, and numerous American Indian nations for control of North America, elegantly remedies this lack of familiarity.

Anderson, a history professor at the University of Colorado and a former Army infantry officer, is the author of Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766, winner of the Francis Parkman and Mark Lynton history prizes in 2001. The War That Made America is a scaled-down telling of that prize-winning epic; it is also a
Companion to a four-hour PBS television series of the same name. There is plenty of history to write about in this war and in the momentous clash of empires, usually viewed by Americans as only hazy background to the American Revolution. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the distribution of power in the northern colonies had been kept in balance by the powerful Iroquois Confederacy, which skillfully played the French against the British in order to survive and thrive. But by midcentury, colonial expansion and land speculation, plus the Iroquois’ own miscalculations, had led to conflict. The initial confrontation was sparked in a remote Allegheny glen by a young George Washington, whose small militia and Indian scouting party had a brief firefight with a French reconnaissance force. From this spark events were set in train that would see early French successes but eventually lead to a “most unequivocal” Anglo-American victory (in large part enabled by the Royal Navy), one that would destroy the American empire of France and place the British crown at its zenith after the Treaty of Paris was ratified in 1763.

Anderson, now perhaps the preeminent historian of the French and Indian War, relates this complex history in an insightful and succinct account. From the gilded halls of power—Whitehall and Versailles—to the remote banks of the Monongahela in the Ohio Valley, the story and its principal participants are clearly described. The key roles of Indian leaders, such as the Delaware chief Teedyuscung, the Seneca chief Tanaghrisson (the “Half King”), and later the Ottawa war chief Pontiac, and their political and war-fighting skills are made unmistakably apparent. Numerous French and English military leaders, including the Marquis de Montcalm and Brigadier General James Wolfe, struck down within minutes of each other on the Plains of Abraham in front of Quebec, are also effectively portrayed. But Anderson’s story is more than a chronological history, along with its significant characters; it is also the tale of cultural and intercultural interaction, with Indians and their different tribal interests an integral part of it.

In the end, the war overturned the balance of power on two continents, essentially subjugated the Native American nations and destroyed their control of their own destinies and lands, and lit the “long fuse” of the American Revolution. Professor Anderson’s skillful account of this rich history is a cautionary story, pointing out the unpredictability and irony that attend war and the pursuit of power, and how “even the most complete victories can sow the seeds of reversal and defeat for victors too dazzled by success to remember that they are, in fact, only human.” This excellent primer by a distinguished historian makes a most convincing case that the French and Indian War transformed the colonists’ world forever, that “it is not too much to call it the war that made America.”

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